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Abstract  
This paper estimates the impact of natural resources rents on non-resource tax revenue 
mobilization. Regressions are carried out using the Panel Smooth Transition Regression model 
for 29 African countries over the period 1995-2012. The empirical results indicate that while 
natural resource rents alone have direct negative impact on non-resource tax revenue, the 
quality of institutions and the level of economic diversification modulate this impact. Natural 
resource rents enhance non-resource tax revenue collection in more diversified economies 
and in economies with favorable institutional environment. These findings urge African 
governments to allocate natural resources revenues towards diversifying the economy and 
strengthening the quality of institutions for enhancing non-resource tax revenue mobilization. 
 
 
Keywords  
Natural resource rents, Non-resource tax revenue, Institutions, Economic diversification, 
Africa.  
 
 
JEL Codes 
A13, H20, H30 
 
 
 
 
4 
1. Introduction
With the drop in global official development assistance and foreign direct investments flows in 
the aftermath of the recent global recession, domestic resource revenue mobilization became 
imperative for African countries. In this regard, identifying the opportunities and specific 
conditions for stimulating tax revenue collection is of crucial importance for policymakers in 
Africa. Natural resources wealth represents a real opportunity for the government to increase 
its tax revenue collection through the taxation of natural resources exploitation (Crivelli and 
Gupta, 2014; Eltony, 2002; Ossowski and Gonzales, 2012; Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 1997; 
Tanzi, 1989; Thomas and Trevino, 2013). While natural resources exploitation may increase 
resource taxes mobilization, its effect on tax collection from non-resource sectors is however 
unclear. Indeed, on the one hand, natural resource exploitation and the resource revenue it 
generates can serve as a catalyst for stimulating the activities of the non-resource sectors and 
therefore enabling more non-resource tax collection from these sectors. But, on the other hand, 
the governments that collect a large share of their budget revenue from natural resources 
exploitation may have incentives to lessen and relax efforts in collecting taxes from non-
resource tax bases. 
Against this background, an emerging literature on the topic indicates that the effect of natural 
resource revenue on non-resource tax revenue is non-linear and depends on the quality of 
institutions (Belinga et al., 2017). The studies from this literature document that natural resource 
rents increase non-resource tax revenue in countries with good institutions and decrease non-
resource tax revenue mobilization in countries with weak institutions. The present paper 
extends this line in the literature by showing that in addition to the quality of institutions, the 
effect of natural resource rent on non-resource tax revenue also depends on the level of 
economic diversification. 
In fact, economic diversification favors the broadening of the non-resource tax base by 
stimulating the activities of tradable sectors suggesting that natural resources may stimulate 
non-resource tax revenues in countries that are more diversified while they are negatively 
associated with non-resource tax revenues in less diversified countries. In other words, 
countries which allocate an important share of their resource revenue to promote the economic 
diversification may experience better non-resource tax revenue than those which do not act in 
this direction. Within this context, this study puts forward that in addition to the quality of 
institutions, the level of economic diversification also matter in the relationship between natural 
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resource revenue and tax effort. More specifically, this paper estimates the direct impact of 
natural resource rents on non-resource tax revenue and the conditional effect of natural 
resources rents on non-resource tax revenue depending on the level of economic diversification 
and the quality of institutions for African economies. The contribution of our study to the 
existing literature on the topic is threefold. 
First, for analyzing the effect of natural resource wealth on non-resource tax collection, instead 
of focusing only on hydrocarbons as Belinga et al (2017) and Bornhorst et al. (2009), we 
consider all the natural resources (hydrocarbons, minerals, fisheries and forests) to take into 
account the diversity of natural resources endowment in Africa1.  
Second, in contrast to most of previous studies on the subject which have considered as 
dependent variable total tax revenue (Botlhole et al, 2012), we rather consider non-resource tax 
revenue to come up with policy-oriented recommendations for facing current tax mobilization 
challenges in Africa. The rationale behind focusing on non-resource tax revenue instead total 
tax revenue is mainly is motivated by the strategic substitution role that non-resource tax system 
could play in mobilizing revenue for African countries in a context of downwards trends in 
natural resources international prices. Indeed, the recent downwards trend and instabilities in 
oil and gas prices suggest the redefinition of the strategy of domestic revenue mobilization 
towards an efficient tax system focused on non-resource taxes. This will help reducing the 
reliance on natural resources as government’s major source of revenue in order to reduce the 
macroeconomic vulnerabilities of African countries to external shocks related to the volatility 
of natural resources’ global prices2. Moreover, given that some natural resource rents are 
generated from non-renewable resources that will eventually be depleted, an efficient tax 
system focused on non-resource taxes will be crucial for sustainable domestic revenues 
mobilization after resource depletion (Fjeldstad et al., 2015). Furthermore, focusing on non-
resource tax revenue mobilization is also relevant in a global context of transition toward low 
carbon economy which might ultimately decrease the importance of hydrocarbons as energy 
sources and thereby negatively affect resource revenue for hydrocarbons exporting countries. 
                                                          
1 In fact, around 30% of the global minerals resources are located in Africa and the continent’s proven oil reserves 
represent 8% of the global stock of oil reserves. Africa also hosts 7% of the world’s stock of natural gas (ANRC, 
2016). Africa's forests and woodlands of Africa are estimated to cover 650 million ha, or 21.8 percent of the 
continent’s land area (FAO, 2003). 
2 Morrissey et al. (2016) provide details discussions on tax revenue performances’ vulnerability to external 
shocks in developing countries. 
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Finally, to our knowledge this is the first study that on the one hand develops theoretical 
arguments to show that economic diversification and institutional quality modulate the impact 
of non-resource tax revenue on non-resource tax revenue and on the other hand, this is the first 
paper that empirically tests the conditional effect of natural resource rents on non-resource tax 
revenue depending on the level of economic diversification for African economies.  
Furthermore, another contribution of this paper is based on the methodological approach. 
Indeed, to our knowledge, this is the first study that uses panel smooth transition regression 
(PSTR) model to estimate the conditional impact of natural resource revenue on tax revenue. 
In fact, in contrast to previous studies which generally draw upon on linear models with 
interaction term between natural resource rents and institutions which suggests a linear 
interaction between resource revenue and institutions in generating non-resource tax revenue 
to estimate the conditional effect of natural resource on non-resource tax revenue, the present 
study relies on non-linear model (PSTR) to estimate the conditional effect of natural resources 
on non-resource tax revenue depending on economic diversification and institutions3. The 
PSTR model has the advantage to take into account heterogeneities in the relationship between 
natural resources rents and non-resource tax revenue since given the heterogeneities in natural 
resources endowments and the dependence on natural resource across African countries; one 
cannot guaranty the homogeneity of the relationship between natural resource revenue and non-
resource tax revenue in Africa. Moreover, the economic diversification and improvement in the 
quality of institutions are not abrupt but rather progressive processes because it takes time to 
observe significant changes in the level of economic diversification and the quality of 
institutions for a given country. The PSTR takes into account these considerations since this 
model assumes smoothness in the conditional effect. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In section 2, we discuss the mechanisms 
through which natural resources could affect non-resource tax collection. Section 3 analyses 
the theoretical impact of resource revenue on non-resource tax revenue depending on 
institutions and economic diversification. Section 4 reviews the empirical literature on the 
relationship between natural resources revenue and non-resource tax revenue in developing 
countries. Then, section 5 motivates and describes in greater details the econometric model, the 
specification tests and the estimation method utilized to test the impact of natural resources 
wealth and non-resource tax revenue. Section 6 is dedicated to the presentation of data. Section 
                                                          
3However, we run linear regressions with interaction term between natural resource rents and the institutional 
quality indicator when the relevance of the PSTR model is not accepted by econometrics tests. 
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7 presents and analyses the estimation results and comes up with policy recommendations that 
could be drawn from the study, while the section 8 concludes the study. 
2. How do natural resources revenues affect non-resource tax revenue mobilization? 
Government could use natural resources revenue to finance basic infrastructure for stimulating 
the whole economic activity, increasing productivity and therefore enhancing tax collection 
from non-resource sectors. Moreover, a country engaged in natural resources projects could 
invest in capacity building programs for the relevant tax administrations officials in order to 
harness a fair value of its natural resources. For instance, the African Natural Resources Center 
(ECNR) of the African Development Bank and OpenOil are supporting capacity building in 
financial modeling for the extractive sector in some African countries for strengthening 
domestic resource mobilization. Financial modeling realizes projections of what should have 
been paid by companies to the government under the existing tax regime and compares it to 
what have been really paid to the government for detecting potential discrepancies around 
natural resources tax revenue collection. In such circumstances, there could therefore be a 
positive spillover effect from building capacity for improving resource taxes collection to 
stimulating non-resource tax revenue mobilization performance. 
In the same vein, some African countries are developing strategies to increase domestic linkages 
of natural resources sector. For example, Guinea has recently requested the assistance of the 
ECNR to undertake a study that should put light on efficient strategies for linking mining 
exploitation to agriculture and energy sectors such that mining sector activities stimulate 
agriculture and energy sectors. In 2017, Zambia in collaboration with the ECNR has undertaken 
and validated a study on local content policies aiming at stimulating local activities through 
mining exploitation. The goal of these strategies is to reinforce the link between natural 
resources activities to the rest of the economy so that natural resources sector act as an engine 
for the others sectors in the economy. In such a context, growth in natural resources activities 
implicitly suggesting an increase in natural resources revenue will boost non-resource sector 
activities and thus more non-resource tax revenue for the government. 
For countries which are experiencing an increase in the level of natural resource revenue, it is 
possible that the demand for transfers and redistribution from the citizens also increase4. Thus, 
                                                          
4 Burkina Faso is in phase to face this situation. In fact, in 2008 it produced just 5.5 tons of gold from two large-
scale projects. Five years after, in 2013, the country has multiplied by 6 its gold production to 33 tones. During 
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if the raise of the demand for transfers is more proportional than the increase in resource 
revenue, the government could turn towards the possibility to increase non-resource tax revenue 
effort in order to satisfy the surplus demand of transfers. From this perspective, natural 
resources revenues act as a catalyst for non-resource tax revenue mobilization. 
However, there is evidence that natural resource wealth can crowd out non-resource tax revenue 
effort. This seems to be the case for African countries where Ndikumana and Abderrahim 
(2010) reveal that these countries have been unable to take advantage of their natural resources 
endowment for raising government revenue collection. Indeed, as stressed by Brun et al, (2015), 
governments that collect a large share of tax revenue from natural resources have less incentive 
to increase efforts in mobilizing tax revenues from non-resource tax bases (crowding out effect 
of resource revenues on non-resource revenue). Furthermore, in order to minimize demand for 
accountability and demand for public goods and services from the citizens and the taxpayers, 
governments with large natural resource revenue may lower the tax burden on their taxpayers.  
The situation of Dutch disease5 that may occur in natural abundance countries is detrimental to 
non-resource tax mobilization as there is a shift of economic activities from non-resource 
sectors to the natural resource sector. Furthermore, the macroeconomic challenges that follow 
natural resources exploitation may significantly threaten the growth of the non-resource 
economy. In fact, an increase in natural resource activities can provoke the appreciation of the 
real exchange rate, thereby disturbing the competitiveness and the productivity growth of the 
non-resource sectors (Arezki et al, 2012) and negatively affect tax revenues collected from these 
sectors. The appreciation of the national currency due to significant revenues from natural 
resources exports can exacerbate inflation and therefore impedes non-resource tax collection as 
suggested by the Oliveira-Tanzi effect (negative effect of inflation on tax revenue). 
                                                          
2018, Burkina Faso expects to produce 55 tons of gold, a two-thirds increase on five years ago (2013). But at the 
same time, the government is facing growing pressure for increasing salaries and transfers. In Côte d’Ivoire, the 
tax revenues generated by the mining companies totaled FCFA 56, 4 billion in 2017, an increase of 39.8% between 
the year 2016 and 2017. During the same period, the public sector workers unions have successfully put pressure 
on the government to pay back unpaid premiums and raise wages in some cases. 
5 Natural resources exports lead to foreign currency inflows in the exporting country which increases the demand 
for national currency and the price of non tradable goods. This leads to an appreciation of the exchange rate of the 
national currency with respect to foreign currencies and thereby reducing the country’s' price competitiveness of 
other products on the international market. 
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3. The conditional effect of resource revenue on non-resource tax revenue depending on 
institutions and economic diversification. 
In this section, we analyze how natural resource revenue can affect non-resource tax revenue 
depending on the quality of institutions and the level of economic diversification. Governments 
in countries with good institutions have more capacity and are more likely to use resource rent 
for investing in establishing an efficient non-resource taxation system that could support and 
allow government revenue mobilization during bad conjuncture on commodities markets and 
when the resource will deplete. Furthermore, resource rich countries with good institutions are 
more capable to apply resource rents towards productive public investments for supporting 
production and economic activities in the non-resource sectors and thereby more revenue 
collection from these sectors. 
Basically, citizens expect the government to use resource revenue for improving their living 
standards (building basic infrastructure, schools and hospitals). Thus, when citizens and 
taxpayers feel that the government is poorly managing natural resources revenue because of 
weaknesses in institutions, they will be incited to reject taxes. In fact, taxpayers could anticipate 
that similarly to resource revenue, the taxes they pay to the government will not serve for 
financing the public needs but rather the ones of the ruling elites and politicians. Clearly, as 
resource revenues increase, non-resource tax revenue compliance will tend to decrease if 
institutions are not functioning well. Accordingly, countries with strong institutions may exhibit 
greater non-resource tax revenue mobilization performance than their peers with relatively 
weak institutions. Furthermore, in countries with weak checks and balances, the ruling 
government could easily use natural resource rents for unproductive purposes rather than 
strengthening the development of non-resource sectors. This will result in less non-resource tax 
revenue collection. 
Economic diversification refers to the actions undertaken for the structural transformation of 
the economy by investing in education, health, basic infrastructure and all other productive 
investments and therefore reduces the higher dependence of the country to one sector, especially 
the extractives sector. Typically, economic diversification suggests diversification of exports 
and output away from greater dependence on commodities and change towards broadly based 
exports and output (Gylfason, 2017), the economic diversification favors the broadening of the 
non-resource tax base by stimulating the activities of tradable sectors. Accordingly, countries 
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which use natural resource revenues to support economic diversification are likely to collect 
more non-resource tax revenues.  
We illustrate this point by comparing the experiences of Nigeria and Indonesia in diversifying 
their economies in a context of oil exploitation. A study undertaken by the AfDB in 
collaboration with Bill and Melinda Gates foundation in 2015 reported that Nigeria and 
Indonesia have experienced oil booms at almost the same period (in the year 1970s). While 
Indonesia managed to diversify its economy by using oil revenue to accelerate investments in 
basic infrastructure (schools, roads, and irrigation) and to subsidize fertilizers for boosting 
agricultural productivity and jobs creation, Nigeria has been affected by the Dutch disease 
(AfDB and Bill and Melinda Gates, 2015). This has putted down the competitiveness of the 
agriculture sector and its contribution to the national income. The loss of competitiveness of 
the agriculture sector has increased the dependency of the government revenue to oil and gas 
exploitation6 and slowed down the country’s economic diversification (Anyaehie and Areji, 
2015). We examine the non-resource tax performance in proportion of GDP for Nigeria and 
Indonesia over the years where data are jointly available for the two countries. Figure 1 below 
shows that Indonesia collected much more non-resource tax revenue in proportion of GDP than 
Nigeria over the period 1992-2009. Nonetheless, the satisfactory point for Nigeria is that it has 
experienced an increase in non-resource tax revenue from 1993 to 2001. This trend could be 
traced to efforts made by the Nigerian government for diversifying the economy over this 
period. However, from the year 2001 to 2009, there is an overall downward trend in Nigeria’s 
non-resource tax revenue. The non-resource tax revenue decreases probably because the 
government might have relaxed its efforts in collecting non-resource tax revenue following the 
increasing oil prices after the year 2000. This trend could also be attributed to potential 
inefficiencies and challenges encountered by government policies in diversifying the economy. 
These challenges including poor policies, weaknesses in economic institutions and governance 
and corruption contributed to lead the diversification index for the country to fall from 0.4 to 
0.3 from the period 1991-2000 to the period 2001-2009 (Anyaehie and Areji, 2015).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 In Nigeria, petroleum revenue accounts for around 80% of government revenue (Anyaehie and Areji, 2015). 
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Figure 1: Nigeria and Indonesia Non-resource tax revenue performances 
 
Source: Author’s construction using ICTD/UNU-WIDER GRD (2017). 
Within this background, we speculate that natural resources stimulate non-resource tax 
revenues in countries that are more diversified while they are negatively associated with non-
resource tax revenues in less diversified countries. Similarly, we expect natural resources boost 
non-resource tax revenue in countries with good institutions while they are negatively 
associated with non-resource tax performance in countries with institutional weaknesses. 
4. Literature review 
The impact of natural resources revenues on tax revenue mobilization tends to be ambiguous in 
the tax effort literature (Botlhole et al. 2012; Gupta, 2007). For 46 sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
Stotsky and WoldeMariam (1997) find a negative impact of mining to GDP on tax revenues 
countries over the period 1990-1995. Drummond et al. (2012) confirm the result of Stotsky and 
WoldeMariam (1997). They find negative association between mining and tax revenues for 28 
SSA countries over the period 1990-2010. In the same region, Thomas and Trevino (2013) find 
that resource revenues have negative impact on non-resource revenue. Based on a sample of 30 
oil-producing countries over the period 1992-2005, Bornhorst et al. (2009) find that revenue 
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panel data for 35 resource-rich countries including 16 African countries over the period 1992-
2009, Crivelli and Gupta (2014) find that resource revenues negatively influence non-resource 
revenue. Ossowski and Gonzales (2012) confirm the eviction effect of resource revenue on non-
resource revenue for 15 Latin American countries over the period 1994-2010. Using data for 
31 resources depending developing countries, Brun and Diakité (2016) run ordinary least 
squares regressions and find that while natural resource rents positively affect total tax 
revenues; they are negatively associated with non-resource tax revenues. 
The studies that found negative impact of natural resource revenue on tax revenues explained 
this result by the fact that the situation of Dutch disease caused by a greater dependence of the 
economy to the mining and petroleum sector to the detriment of other sectors does not 
contribute to broaden the non-resource tax base (Brun et al, 2015). In addition, resource-rich 
countries have strong incentives to relax efforts in mobilizing revenues from non-resource tax 
bases leading to a lower tax collection effort. Furthermore, for minimizing demand for 
accountability regarding the management of resource revenue and demand for transfers from 
the population, governments which collect large natural resource revenue may lower the non-
resource tax burden on its taxpayers (McGuirk, 2013; Ross, 2001) 
Since natural resources are after all an important source of revenues for the government they 
may substantially contribute to increase tax revenue. For SSA, Tanzi (1989) finds that the 
mineral exports in proportion of GDP have a positive impact on tax revenue. Again in SSA, 
Ghura (1998) also finds a positive impact of mining shares in % of GDP on tax ratio. Keen and 
Mansour (2010) find that in SSA, over the period 1980-2005, resource-rich countries have 
performed well than non-resource rich countries in terms of revenue mobilization. 
More recently, for 22 oil producing countries around the world, Knebelmann (2017) finds that 
during the 2000s oil price boom, oil revenue did not crowd out non-oil taxes except for two 
countries (Equatorial Guinea and Timor-Leste),where there are signs of an eviction effect 
between oil revenue and non-oil sector. 
However, few studies have attempted to find out the factor behind the heterogeneous effect of 
natural resource revenues on non-resource tax collection. Why do some resource rich countries 
collect more non-resource tax revenue than others? Botlhole et al. (2012) bring preliminary 
insights on that particular point. For 45 Sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1990-
2007, these authors find that the impact of natural resources rents on non-resource tax revenue 
is driven by the quality of institutions. More precisely, they find that natural resource rents 
increase tax revenue in countries with good institutions and decrease tax revenue mobilization 
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in countries with weak institutions. Botlhole et al. (2012) document that countries with good 
institutions are more likely to set strong apparatus for tax revenue collection through further 
investment in education, health and public infrastructures. While in countries with bad 
institutions, natural resources generate rent-seeking behaviors from policy makers and raise the 
probability of the country to suffer from resource curve situation which is detrimental to tax 
revenue mobilization.  
Belinga et al (2017) extend this line of empirical research. Using 30 resource rich countries 
over the period 1992-2012, they find that hydrocarbon revenues are likely to have an eviction 
effect on non-resource revenues. Nonetheless, in line with the findings of Botlhole et al. (2012), 
these authors underline that the crowding out effect of natural resource revenue on non-resource 
revenue could be mitigated or reversed with an improvement in the quality of institutions. 
 
5. Econometric methodology 
This section develops the empirical model used to estimate the impact of natural resource 
wealth on non-resource tax revenue and presents in greater details the specification tests as well 
as the control variables. 
5.1 Empirical specification 
Because of heterogeneity in natural resources endowment between African countries, the 
impact of natural resource wealth may not be homogeneous across countries. Moreover, the 
efficiency in improving the quality of institutions, diversifying the economy away from natural 
resource sectors and managing natural resources may change gradually over time within each 
country. Accordingly, the impact of natural resource rents on non-resource tax collection 
depending on the level of economic diversification and the quality of institutions may change 
over time within each economy. The Panel Smooth Transition Regression (hereafter PSTR) 
model developed by Gonzales et al (2005) and Fok et al (2005) is well suited to account for 
heterogeneity and time variability in the relationship between natural resources revenue and 
non-resource tax revenues depending on institutions. With the PSTR model, the impact of 
natural resource revenue on non-resource tax revenues takes different values across countries 
depending on the state of economic diversification and institutions (regimes). The PSTR 
assumes that the transition from one regime to another regime is smooth. This is particularly 
interesting in a context of African countries where most of the time, transition or changes in 
institutional quality take time. Clearly, economic diversification in Africa appears as a 
progressive process rather than brutal. In fact, Ghana which is sometimes cited as a good student 
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in terms of governance and institutional quality in Africa has taken time to stabilize, stop the 
series of coup d’états and improve the quality of institutions. On the other hand, Cote d’Ivoire 
which was relatively stable since its independence in 1960 has seen her stability and institutions 
deteriorate over time after the death of the first president from the independence in 1993 with 
the eruption of a rebellion in 2002 and a post electoral conflict in 2011. To summarize, changes 
in the quality of institutions and the level of economic diversification takes time, they are not 
systematic. 
The PSTR model allows countries to change gradually over time between the group of “bad 
institutions” (more diversified) countries and “good institutions” (less diversified) countries 
depending on the level of institutional quality (economic diversification). The PSTR model is 
therefore viewed as a regime-switching model allowing for few extreme regimes. It is a 
generalization of the Panel Threshold Regression (PTR hereafter) of Hansen (1999) in which 
coefficients of some explanatory variables take different values depending on the value of 
another variable called the transition variable. The PTR model assumes a sharp shift from a 
regime to another while the PSTR model allows the coefficients to change smoothly. 
Taking  𝑑𝑖𝑡, an economic diversification index as the transition variable, the PSTR model is 
given as follows: 
𝑵𝑹𝑻𝒊𝒕 = 𝝁𝒊 + 𝜷𝟎𝑵𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝑵𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒕 𝒈(𝒅𝒊𝒕, 𝜸, 𝒄) + 𝜶𝑿𝒊𝒕 +  𝜺𝒊𝒕 (1) 
where 𝑁𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 is non-resource tax revenues and 𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡is natural resource rents in country i at 
time t, for i = 1,..., N, and t = 1,. . . ,T. 
The non-resource tax revenue (excluding social contribution) encompasses all the taxes 
collected from non-resource sectors using tax instruments available in the economy. Data on 
non-resource tax revenue in proportion of GDP are collected from the International Center for 
Taxation and Development (ICTD) Government revenue data base (Prichard et al, 2014).  
Natural resource rent represents the revenue from the export of natural resource (oil, natural 
gas, coal, mineral and forest) netted from costs generated during its production process. Total 
natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents, mineral rents, and 
forest rents as indicated in the statistical notes from the World Development Indicators database 
of the World Bank. 
Études et Documents n° 16, CERDI, 2019
15 
 
In equation (1),  𝜇𝑖 represents an individual fixed effect and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 the usual independent and 
identically distributed error term. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents the vector of traditional determinants of tax 
revenue. 𝑔(𝑑𝑖𝑡, 𝛾, 𝑐) is the transition function. It is a continuous function of the transition 
variable 𝑑𝑖𝑡, and bounded between 0 and 1, defining the two extreme regimes. When 𝑑𝑖𝑡 equals 
0, the impact of natural resources rents (NRR) on non-resource tax revenues (NRT) is 𝛽0 and 
when it equals 1, the impact of NRR on NRT is 𝛽0 + 𝛽1. 
Following Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) and González et al. (2005) the transition function is 
specified as the following logistic function: 𝑔(𝑑𝑖𝑡, 𝛾, 𝑐) = [1 + exp (−𝛾 ∏ (𝑑𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐𝑗))
𝑚
𝑗=1 ]
−1
 (2) 
with γ the slope of the transition function (smoothness parameter) and c = (c1; c2,…; cm ) an m-
dimensional vector of threshold /location parameters. For m = 1 (the case we will focus on here 
in this study) there is one threshold of economic diversification/institutional quality around 
which the impact of NRR on NRT is non-linear. This non-linear impact is represented by a 
continuum of parameters between the two extreme regimes early mentioned (𝑔(𝑑𝑖𝑡, 𝛾, 𝑐) =0 
and 𝑔(𝑑𝑖𝑡, 𝛾, 𝑐) =1). The first extreme regime which is associated with low values of the 
transition variable 𝑑𝑖𝑡 corresponds to the case where the transition function is null 
(𝑔(𝑑𝑖𝑡, 𝛾, 𝑐) =0) while the second extreme regime corresponds to the case where the transition 
function takes the value 1. This latter regime is associated with high values of the transition 
variable 𝑑𝑖𝑡. Between these extreme regimes, the marginal effect of NRR on NRT is given as 
follows: 
𝜕𝑁𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑔(𝑑𝑖𝑡, 𝛾, 𝑐) (3). 
The relation (3) suggests that the effect of NRR on NRT is country and time specific as the 
transition variable 𝑑𝑖𝑡 varies over countries and time. It is worth noting that when the 
smoothness parameter γ tends toward zero ( 0)  , the PSTR model reduces to a simple linear 
panel fixed effects model. As γ tends to infinity ( )   the PSTR model reduces to a threshold 
model with two regimes7 
5.2 Control variables 
Following the literature on tax effort, we include GDP per capita, trade openness, inflation, and 
agricultural value added as control variables (Crivelli and Gupta, 2014; Eltony, 2002; Ossowski 
                                                          
7 It reduces to Hansen’s (1999) two-regime panel threshold regression for m=1. 
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and Gonzales, 2012; Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 1997; Tanzi, 1989; Thomas and Trevino, 
2013). 
Agriculture value added 
Agriculture value added as proportion of GDP is used as a proxy of the sectoral composition of 
the economy. In Africa, the Agriculture sector in developing sector is dominated by a large 
number of small farmers who produce for self-consumption or sell their output in informal 
markets8 or exchange theirs output for other goods9. In addition, most farmers in African 
countries do not keep modern accountings for the management of their farms. All these 
aforementioned factors contribute to the complexity of the agricultural sector’s taxation in 
Africa (Fox and Gurley, 2005; Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 1997; Gupta, 2007). We therefore 
expected negative impact of agriculture value added on non-resource tax revenues in our 
estimations. 
GDP per capita 
GDP per capita measures the level of development. High level of development tends to be 
correlated with a higher capacity to pay and collect taxes. Moreover, high level of development 
goes together with high demand for public goods and services (Wagner’s law). The impact of 
GDP per capita is therefore expected to be positive. 
Trade openness 
Trade openness expressed as the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP is expected 
to increase non-resource tax mobilization as trade openness stimulates trade volume and 
therefore trade taxes. However, in Africa, trade liberalization policies have been implementing 
by cuts in tariffs. These measures have resulted in losses in tax revenues for some countries 
(Baunsgaard and Keen10 , 2010) while others have compensated losses in tariffs by domestic 
taxes (Bird and Gendron, 2007; Cnossen, 2015) rending thereby difficult the prediction of the 
impact of trade openness on non-resource tax revenue. 
 
                                                          
8 Agriculture is often used as a proxy of the informal sector (see Mahdavi, 2008) 
9 It is typically subsistence agriculture (Drummond et al, 2012). 
10 These authors reveal that low income countries have recovered at most 30 cents per dollar lost in tariffs 
reduction. 
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Inflation 
Inflation is proxied by the percentage change in average consumer prices. Its effect on non-
resource tax-to-GDP ratio, the so called "Oliveira-Tanzi effect" is assumed to be negative 
because of lags in tax collection. Indeed, with high inflation rate, the real value of taxes is likely 
to decrease between the date of implementation and the effective date when tax is collected. 
However, because of climb in sales in nominal terms due to inflation, the turnover of firms 
might exceed the threshold of value added tax (VAT) liability making these firms now liable to 
VAT and then lead to increase VAT revenue if there is no explicit VAT threshold adjustment 
(ATAF11, 2017). This latter consideration complicates the prediction of the effect of inflation 
on non-resource tax revenue. 
 
5.3 Specification tests and Estimation method 
Before estimating equation (1), we need to perform some specifications tests. The first batch of 
tests is the linearity test. It tests the homogeneity of the coefficient for the relationship between 
natural resource rents and non-resource tax revenue conditional to the transition variable. In 
other words, the linearity test indicates whether the PSTR model is preferable than a linear 
model to estimate the impact of natural resource rents on non resources tax revenues. The 
rejection of the null hypothesis (H0: Linear fixed effects panel) against the alternative (H1: 
PSTR with m regimes) suggests that the PSTR model is suited to estimate equation (1). 
The homogeneity test in the PSTR model is performing by testing: H0: γ = 0 
or H0: β1 = 0 against the alternative H1: γ≠ 0 or β1 ≠0. However, these tests are nonstandard 
since the PSTR model contains unidentified nuisance parameters under the null hypothesis 
(Hansen, 1996, Gonzales et al, 2005). This identification problem is solved by replacing the 
transition function g(𝑑𝑖𝑡; γ; c) by its first-order Taylor expansion around γ = 0 and to test with 
an equivalent hypothesis based on the following auxiliary regression:  
𝑁𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛽0
∗𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1
∗𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑡  + 𝛼
∗𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ⋯ +  𝛽𝑚
∗ 𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑞𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
∗  (4) 
where  𝛽0
∗ ,  𝛽1
∗ and 𝛽𝑚
∗  are multiple of γ and 𝜀𝑖𝑡
∗  is the usual error term plus the remainder of the 
Taylor development 𝜀𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑅(d_it; γ; c). Accordingly, testing linearity against the PSTR 
model becomes testing H0:  𝛽0
∗ = 𝛽1
∗ = 𝛽𝑚
∗ =0 in the auxiliary equation which is linear. 
                                                          
11 African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) 
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Following Colletaz and Hurlin (2006), the test decision relies on the LM, F-version LM, and 
pseudo-LR tests and their statistics are given as follows: 
LM = TN (SSR0−SSR1)/SSR0 ((follows Chi2 (mk)) 
LMF = [(SSR0−SSR1) /mK] / [SSR0/ (TN−N−m(K + 1))] ∼ F(mk; TN –N-m(k+ 1)) 
LR = −2 [log(SSR1)− log(SSR0) ]. LR follows Chi2 with mk degree of freedom, LR∼Chi2 
(mk). 
where SSR0 is the panel sum of squared residuals under H0 (linear panel model with individual 
effects), SSR1 the panel sum of squared residuals under H1 (PSTR model with two regimes), 
and K the number of explanatory variables. 
After the linearity/homogeneity test, the second specification test is the number of regimes test. 
This test seeks to determine the appropriate number of transition functions (m), implicitly the 
number of regimes (r+1) in the PSTR model. 
The null hypothesis of the test of number of regimes is H0: the PSTR model has one transition 
function (m = 1) while the alternative hypothesis is H1: the PSTR model has at least two 
transition functions (m = 2). The decision of the test is based on the statistics of LMw and LMf. 
If the coefficients are statistically significant at the 5%, the null hypothesis is rejected 
suggesting that there are at least two transition functions for the PSTR model. In this case, a 
two-regime PSTR model is then estimated. If the two regime model is also rejected, a three 
regime model is estimated. The testing procedure continues like that until the non-rejection of 
the null hypothesis of no remaining heterogeneity. 
The non-rejection of H0 suggests that the model has one transition function, two regimes. The 
estimation method of the PSTR consists of eliminating the individual fixed effects μi by 
removing country specific means and then applying non-linear least squares to the transformed 
model (Gonzalez et al, 2005). 
6. Data 
Regressions are carried out using a sample of 29 African countries12 over the period 1995-2012. 
We extract natural resource rents data from the World Development Indicator (WDI), the World 
                                                          
12 The list of countries is given in appendix. 
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Bank database. Natural resource rents is the revenue from the export of natural resources (oil, 
natural gas, coal, mineral and forest) netted from their production costs. 
We measure institutional quality by the government stability index13 from international Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG). The higher the index, the better institutions. Government stability is crucial 
for converting natural resources revenue towards non-resource sectors development. In fact, 
when the members of the ruling government feel that the uncertainties are increasing about the 
future of their stay in power, they may be motivated to adopt rent seeking behaviors before the 
possible end of their regime. Practically, they will ignore the implementation of broaden based 
policies that promote the development of non-resource sectors activities while grabbing 
resource revenue to finance their supporters and buying opponents for organizing resistance. 
They could also lessen the tax burden on groups of taxpayers for getting their support in order 
to resist and stay in power. 
The dependent variable, non-resource tax revenue is directly extracted from the Government 
Revenue Database (GRD) of the International Centre for Tax and Development (Prichard et al, 
2014). Non-resource tax revenue encompasses all the taxes collected from tax base other than 
natural resources. The control variables including trade openness, inflation, agriculture value 
added and GDP per capita are taken from the World Development Indicators database, the 
World Bank. 
We measure economic diversification by the share of manufactures exports in the total exports 
of merchandise. This indicator provides an interesting picture about the structure of exports and 
could therefore reflect an acceptable measure of economic diversification. Data on 
manufactures exports in percent of merchandise exports are extracted from WDI, the World 
Bank database. As indicated in the statistical notes of the WDI database, manufactures include 
chemicals, basic manufactures, machinery and transport equipment, and miscellaneous 
manufactured goods, and exclude non-ferrous metals. The three linearity tests validate the 
preference for the PSTR model with manufactures as transition variable comparatively to the 
linear model 
Given that large countries with relatively vast internal market may not export much to the rest 
of the world, exports diversification index may show partial picture of the state of 
                                                          
13 The government stability index from ICRG indicates the ability of the government to stay in office and to 
implement its program. Government unity, legislative strength and popular support are the three components 
used to construct the government stability indicator (see ICRG methodology). 
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diversification. However, since African countries tend to be more outward oriented because of 
the relatively small size of their internal markets, we think that an exports based diversification 
index is suitable and acceptable as an economic diversification index for African economies 
(Alsharif et al, 2017). Descriptive statistics on all these variables are provided in table 1 below. 
For our sample, on average the non-resource tax revenue is 15.5% of GDP while natural 
resource rents account for 12% of GDP (table 1). On average, manufactures exports account 
for 30% of total merchandise exports for the countries under investigation in this study (table 
1). 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
            
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Non resource tax revenue 506 15.512 8.652 3.205 62.828 
Natural resource rents 505 12.120 15.073 .0037 77.054 
Government stability 432 8.911 1.643 4 11.083 
GDP per capita 522 2535.6 2742.25 168.931 12633.8 
Trade openness 522 77.473 39.846 17.434 261.529 
Inflation 522 8.001 10.988 -18.222 132.823 
Agriculture value added 518 21.113 13.214 1.953 51.848 
Export diversification index 400 3.982 1.090 1.784 6.063 
Manufactures exports (% 
merchandise exports) 458 29.857 26.272 0.0242 94.875 
Source: Author’s calculations from ICTD-GRD (Prichard et al, 2014); WDI, ICRG and 
IMF (2017). 
7. Impact of natural resource rents on non-resource tax revenue: specification tests and 
Estimation results 
This section first presents results from specification tests and those obtained from the estimation 
of the impact of natural resources rents on non-resource tax revenue depending on institutions 
and diversification. Then, results from various robustness analyses are presented and finally, 
the section comes up with policy implications which could be drawn from the study.  
7.1 Linearity and unit root tests  
The linearity tests results are reported in table 2 below. The three linearity tests reject the null 
hypothesis of linearity of the relationship between natural resource rents and non-resource tax 
revenue conditional to the level of economic diversification suggesting that the impact of 
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natural resources rents on non-resource tax revenue depends on the country’s economic 
diversification. The PSTR model is therefore appropriate for our case. 
 
Table 2: Linearity tests 
Threshold variables 
Wald  
LM test  
Fisher  
test  
Pseudo 
LRT test  
IMF Export 
Diversification 
index 
3.116* 
(0.07)  
2.866* 
(0.09) 
3.130* 
(0.07) 
L.(IMF Export 
Diversification 
index) 
4.343** 
(0.03) 
3.985** 
(0.04)  
4.372**  
(0.03) 
Government 
stability 1.342 1.235 1.344 
Polity2 
47.665*** 
(0.000)  
9.843***  
(0.000) 
50.27*** 
(0.000) 
Manufactures 
exports (% 
merchandise 
exports) 
16.692*** 
(0.005) 
3.197*** 
(0.008) 
17.029***  
(0.004) 
Note: P-values are in parenthesis. 
Before carrying out regressions, we run panel unit root test to see whether the variables under 
consideration are stationary as the time dimension of our panel is relatively long. We apply 
Maddala and Wu (1999) (Fisher type test) to take into account the heterogeneity of our panel 
data (in terms of natural resources rents, non-resource tax collection and economic 
diversification) and the fact that the panel data is unbalanced. Results from Fisher test reported 
in Table 3 below indicates that for all the variables the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is 
rejected. 
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Table 3: Fisher type unit root test 
Variables Maddala and  
Wu ADF-Fisher , 
 inverse chi2 
Non resource tax revenue 
133.498 
 (0.000) 
Natural resource rents 
151.121  
(0.000) 
GDP per capita 
79.407  
(0.032) 
Trade openness 
122.319  
(0.000) 
Inflation 
242.760  
(0.000) 
Agriculture value added 
 172.062 
 (0.000) 
Government stability 
177.601  
(0.000) 
Note: P-values are in parenthesis. 
7.2 PSTR estimation of the impact of resource rents on non-resource tax revenue 
depending on diversification 
This subsection analyses and discusses the main results obtained from the estimation of the 
empirical model.  
7.2.1 Main results 
Table 4 displays the results obtained from the estimation of the PSTR model. The direct impact 
of natural resources rent on non-resource tax revenue (measured by βo) is negative and 
statistically significant at 5% (table 4). This result is in line with those found in previous work 
indicating that natural resources revenue undermine the governments’ effort to properly tax 
non-resource sector (Brun et al, 2015, Crivelli and Gupta, 2014). While the direct effect of 
natural resources rents on non-resource tax revenue is negative, the effect of its interaction with 
economic diversification (nonlinear effect) is positive. In other words, this result reveals that 
natural resource rents contribute to non-resource tax revenue mobilization in more diversified 
economies while they slow down non-resource tax collection only in less diversified 
economies. 
The location parameter for this regression C=32.990 is higher than the average manufacturing 
exports (the threshold variable) equals to is 29.857, suggesting that countries with 
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manufacturing exports level below the threshold value 29.857 need additional efforts towards 
improving economic diversification to reverse the crowding out effect of natural resource rents 
on non-resource tax revenue collection. 
We plotted in figure 2 the elasticity of non-resource tax revenue with respect to resource rents, 
depending on the values of manufacturing exports. From the lower to higher regimes, the 
elasticity of resource rents with respect to non-resource tax revenues smoothly increases as 
manufacturing exports (the threshold variable) increase. Accordingly, any improvement in 
diversifying the economy (higher manufacturing exports) will result in a gradual increase in the 
non-resource tax revenue effect of resource rents (from -0.063 to 0.754). 
Figure 2: Elasticities of non-resource tax revenue with respect to resource rents 
conditional on manufacturing exports. 
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Table 4: Impact of Natural resources rents on Non-resource tax revenue depending on 
economic diversification 
Dependent variable :Non-
resource tax revenue (% 
GDP)  
 
Transition variable Manufactures 
exports (% 
merchandise 
exports) 
Natural resource rents (βo) 
-0.201*** 
(0.013) 
Natural resource rents (β1) 
0.331 *** 
(0.0682) 
GDP per capita 
0.0002** 
(0.000) 
Trade openness 
0.017** 
(0.005) 
Inflation 
-0.048***  
(0.012) 
Agriculture value added 
-0.204*** 
(0.025) 
Gamma (γ) 
0.160 
 
C 57.528 
AIC criterion 1.291 
BIC criterion 1.380 
Observations 345 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
7.2.2 Further analysis: overview on country-specific cases. 
For few number of countries, the economic diversification indicator over the period 1995-2012 
have been generally above or below the threshold value identified in the estimation. More 
precisely, countries such as Botswana, Lesotho, Morocco, Mauritius, Swaziland, Tunisia and 
South Africa have always had the maximum impact of resource rents on non-resource tax 
revenue (higher regime) as their manufactures exports in percentage of total merchandise 
exports were most of time above the threshold. This result suggests that these countries have 
been efficient in using resource rents towards stimulating non-resource tax revenue 
mobilisation through diversification. In other words, these countries did not experience any 
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crowding out effect of resource rents on non-resource tax collection because of their relatively 
advanced level of economic diversification.  
The presence of Botswana among the group of countries where resource rents do not crowd out 
non-resource tax revenue collection is not surprising. In fact, Botswana has received praise and 
has gained a worldwide reputation for its management of extractive resources wealth. The 
success of Botswana, among other factors is related to the fact that the country has placed a 
attention to the development of non-mining sector. 
Indeed, from the beginning of mining exploitation in the country (1970s), the authorities have 
always kept in mind that the role of extractives in the economy will eventually decline. 
Accordingly, the government used revenue from extractives resources as a platform to boost 
the diversification of the economy. In fact, the policy in Botswana aimed at utilising revenues 
collected from minerals to finance investments in other sectors in order to create a strong basis 
for revenue generation that can eventually replace mineral revenue. Accordingly, almost the 
entire mineral wealth was used to finance investments in education, healthcare and physical 
capital. For instance, during the period 1983-1984 to 2014-2015, the total mineral revenues 
amounted to BWP406bn (US$39bn, €33bn) at 2012 prices, and these revenues were almost 
entirely invested in physical and human capital (ANRC, 2016b). This policy has spurred the 
development of the private sector and has reduced the importance of the mining sector in the 
economy. In fact, from 2004 to 2014, the non-mining private sector grew by 128 percent, while 
the mining sector collapsed by 13 percent (ANRC, 2016b). The ANRC (2016b) argues that 
these developments (faster growth of the non-mining sector compared to the mining sector) 
provide an indication that economic diversification policies in Botswana have to some extent 
succeeded. The tendency towards diversifying the economy away from mining sector has 
fostered the development of non-mining sectors and has therefore sustained greater tax revenue 
collection from these sectors. As early mentioned, in addition to Botswana, we also find positive 
impact of resource rents on non-resource tax revenue collection for some countries like 
Swaziland, Morocco and Tunisia. In spite of the potential institutional deficiencies in these 
countries, resource rents favour the mobilisation of non-resource tax revenue because of the 
relatively more advanced state of economic diversification in these countries compared with 
their peers. This result suggests that beyond institutions, economic diversification could reverse 
the crowding-out effect of resource revenue on non-resource tax collection.  
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In contrast, for countries like Algeria, Cameroon, Nigeria, Sudan, Republic of Congo, Gabon 
Mali, Burkina Faso, Malawi, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Tanzania, resource rents have 
experienced a crowding out effect of resource rents on non-resource tax revenue mobilisation 
because of weak economic diversification level, such that higher resource rents, not only relax 
government efforts in collecting taxes from non-resource sectors, but also in some extent, shrink 
the development of these sectors. 
Nonetheless, for some countries like Togo, there is change in the impact of resource rents on 
non-resource tax revenue. For this country, the impact of resource rents on non-resource tax 
revenue shifted from negative values (low regime: -0.063) to positive value (high regime: 0.61). 
Togo achieved in 2003 the critical threshold of manufactures exports in percent of total 
merchandise exports for which the crowding out effect of resource rent on non-resource tax 
revenue is reversed. In fact, over the last two decades, in Togo, efforts have been made to 
diversify the economy away from phosphate and cotton in order to develop the industrial sector 
and to attract foreign direct investments, especially with the creation of a free trade zone for 
exports processing and the construction of roads infrastructures. The country has also 
strengthened and has modernized the equipment and the capacities of the port of Lomé in order 
to revitalize the country's transit function in the West African Economic and monetary Union 
(WAEMU) region, mainly for the landlocked countries (Mali, Burkina and Niger). As a result, 
based on the IMF Theil diversification index, in its 2017 report on international trade, the 
Central Bank of West African Countries remarked that Togo is one the WAEMU countries 
which has recorded the highest performance in improving the economic diversification over the 
period 2006-2017.  
Adversely for countries such as Senegal, the degradation of the business environment since the 
year 2000s which has slowed down economic diversification has ultimately (ceteris paribus) 
negatively affected the elasticity of non-resource tax revenue to resource rents (transition from 
high non-resource tax revenue regime to low regime). Indeed, as explained in Jude and 
Levieuge (2016), Senegal has implemented a package of policy reforms aiming at improving 
the country's business climate. These reforms contribute to the emergence and the development 
of indigenous enterprises. However, during the 2000s, frequent government change with its 
corollary of concentration of executive power, and sometimes high state interference in the 
economy. This has reduced the activities of foreign investors in the country and finally slowed 
down the diversification of the economy and thereby negatively affect non-resource tax 
collection. This result could serve as a lesson for Senegal which is expected to start oil 
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production in 2021. The country may consider paying attention to factors that sustain economic 
diversification such that the country does not suffer from the crowding out effect of oil 
exploitation on non-resource tax collection.  
Finally, we find that the elasticity of non-resource tax revenue to resource rents has been volatile 
for a certain number of countries where the economic diversification indicators fluctuate. 
Namibia and Madagascar are among these countries.  
Although Namibia has achieved significant development outcome (the country’s GDP per 
capita was USD 5 227,18 in 2017, WDI) thanks to mining exploitation, the country's level of 
economic diversification is still relatively low mainly because of weak backward and forward 
linkages between mining sector and non-mining sectors. Nonetheless, over the past two decades 
efforts have been made towards the diversification of the economy. The manufacturing sector’s 
contribution to GDP increased from 5.3 percent in 1990 to 11.3 percent in 2012, mainly due to 
the quick development of fish and meat processing and some mineral beneficiation. As a result, 
over the periods 2000-2002 and 2004-2006, the country even exhibits positive elasticity of non-
resource tax revenue with respect to resource rents. However, from 2010 to 2012 the country’s 
elasticity of non-resource tax revenue to resource rents was negative while it was positive for 
the year 2009. 
Basically, one of the real challenges with Namibian economic diversification is the fact that the 
manufacturing sector is concentrated on mineral processing activities, such that the 
manufacturing exports and therefore economic diversification is vulnerable to fluctuations of 
mineral prices. Consequently, the country could not enjoy better non-resource tax collection 
both in periods of mining booms (because of relaxing effort in collecting taxes from other non-
mining sectors) and mining busts (because of weak tax potential from non-mining sectors due 
to a potential slowdown in the mineral processing manufacturing activities). The country 
therefore could consider scaling up its diversification level by strengthening the productivity of 
the agro-industry  
7.3 Estimation results of non-resource tax revenue elasticity to resource rents depending 
on institutions 
We now turn to the estimation of the effect of natural resources rents on non-resource tax 
revenue depending on the quality of institutions. Government stability is used as measure of 
institutional quality and therefore as the transition variable in the PSTR model. However, the 
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three linearity tests carried out using government stability as the transition variable fail to reject 
the linearity hypothesis (table 2 in appendix) suggesting that the PSTR model is not suitable to 
test for the non-linear effect of natural resource rents on non-resource tax revenue depending 
on government stability14. Accordingly, as Botlhole et al (2012), we estimate a simple panel 
data model by including the interaction term between natural resource rents and government 
stability as an explanatory variable to test for the non-linear effect of natural resources rents on 
non-resource tax revenue depending on the institutions. The estimation results from the fixed 
effects panel data model are reported in table 5. In column (1) of table 5, we both introduce 
natural resource rents and government stability as explanatory variables, but we do not include 
their interaction term as control variable. Column (2) reports results obtained from panel fixed 
effects estimator with Driscoll Kray (DK-FE) autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity standard 
errors correction. The results show that natural resource rents negatively affect non-resource 
tax revenue while government stability fosters non-resource tax collection. In column (2) of 
table 5, we introduce the interaction term of natural resource rents and government stability. 
The interaction term is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level suggesting that as 
the quality of institutions improves, natural resources revenue becomes an important engine of 
non-resource tax revenue. Natural resource rents still negatively affect non-resource tax revenue 
and government stability is always positively associated with better non-resource tax 
mobilization. In summary, our estimation results show that natural resource rents slow down 
non-resource tax revenue in countries with weak institutions while they stimulate non-resource 
tax ratio in countries with better institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 Similar results were found when we use an alternative indicator of institutional quality, namely political 
rights, civil liberties and bureaucracy quality. 
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Table 5: Non-linear effect of natural resource rents on non-resource tax revenue: fixed 
effects model with interaction term. 
Non-resource tax revenue 
 
(1) 
FE-DK 
(2) 
FE-DK 
Natural resource rents (Rents) -0.044** -0.046* 
 (0.019) (0.025) 
Government Stability 0.161*** 0.157** 
 (0.047) (0.059) 
Rents*Government Stability  0.0002** 
  (0.002) 
GDP per capita 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade openness 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Inflation -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.00845) (0.00827) 
Agriculture value added -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) 
Constant 7.091*** 7.116*** 
 (1.454) (1.395) 
   
Observations 398 398 
Number of countries 24 24 
   
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
7.4 Robustness analysis 
In this subsection, we analyze whether the main results obtained from the estimation of the 
baseline equation (equation 1) remain unchanged under some circumstances. 
7.4.1 Alternative indicators of economic diversification and the quality of institutions. 
Alternative indicator of institutions 
We test whether our results resist to a change in the indicator of institutional quality. Since 
institutions are likely to work better in democratic regimes than autocratic ones, we use as 
institutional variable the indicator Polity from polity IV database (Marshall et al, 2014). In 
addition to the fact that it covers many countries over long period, Acemoglu et al (2003) argue 
that this indicator “is conceptually attractive since it measures institutional and other 
constraints that are placed on presidents and dictators (or monarchies)” (p.52). The indicator 
polity ranges from -10 (autocratic) to +10 (democratic) regimes. The linearity tests validate the 
PSTR model with polity as the transition variable (table 2). The PSTR estimation results using 
polity as threshold variable are reported in table 6. The main findings of the chapter remain 
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qualitatively unchanged. Natural resources rents are negatively associated to non-resource tax 
revenue. However, with better institutions, natural resources rents foster non-resource tax 
collection in Sub-Saharan Africa (table 6, column 2) suggesting that the baseline results of this 
study are robust to the use of alternative indicator of institutions.  
The threshold variable C=6.116 while the average polity index for the countries under 
consideration is equal to 1.4 suggesting that African countries should significant increase effort 
to improve institutions such that natural resource rents contribute to enhance non-resource tax 
revenue. Indeed, countries such as Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Mauritius well known 
for their relative political stability and for their relatively well functioning institutions have 
always had the maximum elasticity of non-resource tax revenue with respect to resource rents 
depending on the quality of institutions.  
More interestingly, countries such as Ghana, Kenya and Lesotho shift from negative elasticity 
of non-resource tax revenue with respect to resource rents conditional on the institutions to 
positive elasticities. The critical threshold of the indicator of institutions quality (polity2) has 
been achieved in Ghana in 2001. For Ghana, it was the period of government instability with 
the series of coups d’etats from 1966 (ten years after its independence) to 2000 which has led 
to a negative effect of resource rents on non-resource tax revenue. In fact, since 2000, efforts 
made by Ghana in moving away from political instability and establishing democratic 
institutions have contributed, all things being equal, to reverse the crowding out effect of 
resource revenue on non-resource tax revenue mobilization. Indeed, in 2000, under the 
provision of the fourth republic, Jerry Rawlings, the ruling president was prohibited by term 
limits provision for running for a third presidential mandate. The opposition party's candidate, 
John Kufour won the presidential elections that year. This orderly transition between parties 
was an important signal of the political stability of Ghana. The president John Kufour focused 
his actions in developing Ghana's economy and enhancing the country’s' international 
reputation. As a result, he was reelected in 2004. However, in 2008, after two mandates, Kufour 
cannot run for a third presidential mandate. Thus, in 2008, John Atta Mills, Rawlings' former 
Vice-President who had lost to Kufour in the 2000 elections, won the election and therefore 
replaced Kufour. In 2012, the president John Atta Mills passed away in office and his Vice-
President, John Dramani Mahama, temporarily replaced him. After this peaceful and smooth 
transition of power to Dramani Mahama, in 2012, subsequent presidential elections were 
organised in the same year as provided by the constitution. John Dramani Mahama won that 
election. In 2016, Nana Akufo Addo defeated Mahama in a single round during general 
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elections. This was the first time that a ruling president failed to win a second presidential term 
in Ghana. Despite that, the transition of power from Dramani Mahama to Akufo Addo was on 
overall peaceful. 
Alternative indicator of diversification 
While manufactures exports in percent of merchandise exports measures the structure of exports 
across products categories, this measure however does not capture the number of exported 
products, which, yet reflects the diversity of exported products. The economic diversification 
indicator (export diversification index) developed by the International Monetary Fund15 (IMF) 
takes into account this consideration. Indeed, this index considers both extensive export 
diversification (reflecting change in the number of export products) and intensive export 
diversification (reflecting change in the shares of export volumes across export products such 
that a country is considered less diversified when only a few sectors are driving export revenue, 
even if the country is exporting many different goods). Higher values of the index indicate 
lower exports diversification. For robustness check, we alternatively use the IMF export 
diversification index as the economic diversification indicator. To facilitate the interpretation 
of results, we inverse the diversification index in our regressions so that higher values of this 
index reflects higher economic diversification of in the country’s under investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 Data on this index are available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/res/dfidimf/diversification.htm 
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Table 6: PSTR estimation of the conditional impact of natural resources rents on non-
resource tax revenue depending on economic diversification: Alternatives measures of 
diversifications and institutions 
Dependent variable: Non-
resource tax revenue  (1)  (2) 
Transition variable : IMF export 
diversification 
index Polity2 
Natural resource rents (βo) -0.063                                
(0.021) 
-0.074
(0.016) 
Natural resource rents (β1) 0.818***           
(0.182) 
0.254** 
(0.129) 
GDP per capita 0.001***                            
(0.000) 
0.002***
(0.000) 
Trade openness 0.046                      
(0.034) 
0.054*** 
(0.018) 
Inflation 
-0.073  
(0.163) 
-0.098 
(0.062) 
Agriculture value added -0.220  
(0.107) 
--0.145 
(0.038) 
Gamma (γ) 
0.209 1.627 
C 
0.2 6.363 
AIC criterion 1.489 1.597 
BIC criterion 1.587 1.695 
Observations 270 270 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
7.4.2 Alternative measure of natural resource wealth 
So far, natural resource rents have been used as an indicator of natural resource wealth. The 
variable natural resource rents extracted from the WDI, the World Bank database has the 
advantage to cover a wide range of African countries over long periods thereby allowing 
reducing the risk of sample selection bias. Moreover, it could mitigate the endogeneity problem 
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resulting from reverse causality between non-resource tax revenue and natural resources wealth. 
In fact, it is unlikely that non-resource tax revenue at the current period in a given country will 
affect resource rents because the latter largely depend on the country’s endowment in natural 
resources and world commodity prices which are exogenous to African countries. Despite these 
qualities, uncertainties around production costs for natural resources extraction could cast doubt 
on the accuracy and relevance of natural resource rents data. Since, the confidence about 
production costs could be challenged; one should take with caution the measures of natural 
resources wealth which include production costs in their calculations. In addition, the World 
Bank's natural resources data refer to rents captured both by the private and the public sector 
(Klomp and de Haan, 2016). Even if in most countries African, governments attempt to capture 
the largest share of rents, given the purpose of this study, it should be desirable to isolate rents 
received by public sector. We take onboard all these considerations above by replacing natural 
resource rents by resource taxes in the baseline specification. Resource taxes are tax revenues 
collected from natural resources sector (resource taxes). Data on resource taxes are directly 
taken from the ICTD-GRD database (Prichard et al, 2014). PSTR Regressions are therefore 
carried using as interest variable resources taxes instead of resource rents. Estimation results 
are reported in table 7. We find that resources taxes exert negative impact though not 
statistically significant on non-resource tax revenue. However, the impact of resource taxes on 
non-resources taxes depending on the level of economic diversification and the quality of 
institutions are positive and statistically significant at 5% level (table 7). These results suggest 
that the main results of this paper qualitatively remain to the use of alternative measure of 
resource wealth. The conditional impact of resource wealth on non-resource tax revenue 
(depending on institutions and diversification) is positive while the direct impact of resource 
wealth on non-resource tax revenue is negative.  
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Table 7: Conditional impact of resources taxes on non-resource tax revenue depending on 
economic diversification and institutions. 
Dependent variable:  
Non-resource tax 
revenue 
Transition 
variable: IMF 
Diversification 
index 
Transition 
variable: 
Government 
stability 
Resource taxes (βo) 
- 1.403             
(0.198) 
- 0.519        
  (0.062)  
Resource taxes (β1) 
1.589*** 
(0.412) 0.11**             (0.051) 
GDP per capita 
0.0004          
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
 (0.0003) 
Trade openness 
0.068*** 
(0.014) 
0.054*** 
 (0.014) 
Inflation 
-0.010         
  (0.016) -0.008 (0.015) 
Agriculture value 
added 
-0.196            
(0.032) 
-0.021   
(0.021) 
Gamma (γ) 0.967 588.11 
C 0.227 7.124 
AIC criterion 0.371 0.604  
BIC criterion 0.469  0.702 
Observations 270 270 
Wald test, pvalue 0.000 0.06 
LRT, pvalue 0.000 0.056 
Fisher Test, pvalue 0.000 0.079 
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
7.4.3 Discussing and mitigating the potential endogeneity issue of the explanatory 
variables. 
Our estimations may suffer from a potential endogeneity bias that needs to be addressed. 
Endogeneity can arise from reverse causality between natural resource rents and non-resource 
taxes. On the one hand, natural resources can weaken government efforts to mobilize non-
resource tax revenues. On the other hand, a government could rely on natural resources 
exploitation because of the narrowness of the non-resource tax base or because non-resource 
tax revenues are no longer enough to cover its financing needs. In fact, recent developments on 
oil, gas and mining projects in Africa corroborate the desire of African governments to increase 
domestic revenue mobilization. More precisely, over the recent years, African countries, 
especially East African countries have invested more in natural resources projects to increase 
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domestic revenue collection. As outcome, in our knowledge, all of the African countries have 
undertaken oil exploration activities except Swaziland. In 2015 and 2016, nine of the worldwide 
top 20 discoveries were made in Africa (PWC, 2016). There are mostly gas and account for 
57% of the reserves discovered. Up to date almost all the African countries are involved in at 
least one oil project. Clearly, the tendency towards exploiting natural resources across all the 
countries in the African continent provides indications that the difficulty and inability to collect 
more non- resource taxes and the narrowness of non- resource tax bases may stimulate natural 
resources exploitation and therefore affect natural resource rents. This consideration suggests 
that the variable natural resource rents is potentially endogenous in the baseline equation (1). 
The instrumental variable (IV) technique is usually used to address the endogeneity issue in the 
estimation of econometric models. However, IV methods have not yet been developed in a 
PSTR context. Thus, instead of current values, we include one-year lag values of natural 
resource rents, GDP per capita, Trade openness, Inflation and Agriculture value added to 
mitigate the reverse causality problems. This approach16 is acceptable in our case since 
resources collected from natural resources previously influences the government current 
behavior regarding non-resource tax revenues mobilization whereas current level of non- 
resource tax revenue cannot affect natural resources rents that have already been collected. We 
also lagged the transition variable to mitigate the issue of reverse causality since if economic 
diversification is a vehicle for increasing non-resource tax mobilization; countries with high tax 
revenue are more likely to diversify their economies. As indicated in table 8, even using one-
year lagged value of diversification as the transition variable, the three linearity tests suggest 
that the PSTR model is still suitable to estimate the effect of natural resource rents on non-
resource tax revenue depending on the level of economic diversification. Estimation results are 
displayed in table 8 Results are qualitatively the same as those reported in table suggesting that 
the main findings of this study are robust to potential endogeneity of control variables. The 
direct effect of natural resources rents on non-resource tax revenue is negative. The non-linear 
effect of non-resource tax revenue depending economic diversification, measured by β1 is 
positive. 
 
                                                          
16 Jude and Levieuge (2016) adopt the same approach to address the endogeneity problem in their PSTR estimation 
of the conditional effect of foreign direct investments on economic growth depending on the quality of institutions. 
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Table 8: Natural resource rents and non-resource tax revenue: mitigating the potential 
endogeneity issue of explanatory variables. 
Dependent variable: Non-resource tax revenue  
Transition variable : L.Diversification 
(manufactures export 
in % merchandise 
exports) 
Natural resource rents (βo) -0.262*** 
(0.030) 
Natural resource rents (β1) 0.359*** 
(0.102) 
GDP per capita 0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
Trade openness 0.023*** 
(0.005) 
Inflation -0.042*** 
(0.012) 
Agriculture value added -0.143*** 
(0.021) 
Gamma (γ) 0.063*** 
(0.017) 
C 24.513*** 
(5.510) 
AIC criterion 1.276 
BIC criterion 1.369 
Observations 323 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
7.4.4 Control for path dependence in non-resource tax revenue. 
Previous studies on tax effort have revealed persistence in tax revenue performance suggesting 
that tax revenue-collected at the current date depends on the tax revenue collected at previous 
periods (Agbeyegbe et al., 2006; Gnangnon and Brun, 2017; Gupta, 2007; Baunsgaard and 
Keen, 2010; Leuthold, 1991). Indeed, government finances current tax revenue collection with 
tax revenue previously collected. To take onboard this consideration, we follow the approach 
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adopted in the literature by including one-year lagged value of non-resource tax revenue among 
the explanatory variables, leading to specify a dynamic model. Since the PSTR model is static 
by nature (see Gonzales et al, 2005), we estimate a dynamic panel fixed effect model to control 
for inertia in non-resource tax revenue. The specification of the dynamic model allows 
correcting for the serial correlation of the error term (Gupta, 2007) and it helps preventing from 
econometrics problem related with omitted variable bias (Bond, 2002). The estimation of 
dynamic model with fixed effects estimator would lead to inconsistent estimates because of the 
dynamic panel bias (known as Nickell bias) caused by the correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and the error term. 
Nonetheless, the dynamic panel data bias tends to zero as the time length of the panel data tends 
to infinity (Nickell, 1981). More practically, Hurlin and Venet (2001) consider that for a time 
dimension of 31 the dynamic panel bias could be neglected. But our panel dimension which is 
equal to 18 (T=18) is not sufficiently high in the sense of Hurlin and Venet (2001) to consider 
that the Nickell (1981) bias is negligible with fixed effect estimator. Following the literature on 
the estimation of dynamic panel data model, we therefore rely on system GMM estimator to 
estimate the dynamic specification of equation 1 in order to obtain consistent and efficient 
estimates. More interestingly, in addition to the correction of the panel data bias, the system 
GMM estimator corrects for potential endogeneity bias of the other explanatory variables. This 
feature of system GMM makes this estimator suitable and relevant in our case as some of the 
structural determinants of non-resources tax revenue we included in our specification may be 
endogenous like the GDP per capita. In fact, GDP per capita affect non-resource tax revenue 
through an increase in the taxable income. However, countries with higher non-resource tax 
revenue are more likely to finance broad-based economic growth policies for improving the 
GDP per capita.  
There are two categories of GMM estimator: the first-difference GMM estimator (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991), and the GMM system estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The first-difference 
GMM estimator eliminates individual unobserved fixed-effects by first difference and uses 
previous level values of the lagged differenced variables as instrumental variables (see Blundell 
and Bond, 1998). The system GMM estimator combines the equation in differences with the 
equation in levels and uses lagged first differences as instrumental variables for the levels 
equation and lagged levels are used as instrumental variables for the first-difference variables. 
The system GMM estimator performs better than the first GMM difference estimator in the 
presence of high persistence in the variables under consideration (Blundell and Bond, 1998) 
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and when cross-sectional variability dominates time variability. The validity of the instrumental 
variables in system GMM regressions is checked through the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions and the Arellano and Bond’s autocorrelation tests. Arellano-Bond (AB) tests of 
autocorrelation determine whether there is first-order serial correlation in the error term [AR 
(1)] and no second-order autocorrelation in the residuals [AR (2)]. In addition, with the system 
GMM estimator, we must ensure that the total number of instruments does not exceed the 
number of countries to avoid the problem of "instrument proliferation" in the estimations 
(Roodman, 2009). We collapse the set of instrumental variables to avoid the instrument 
proliferation problem in the estimations. Similarly to growth regressions, we split the time span 
of the panel data in three-year non-overlapping intervals to obtain six-year panel data 
(1995/1997; 1998/2000; 2001/2003; 2004/2006; 2007/2009; 2010/2012). This transformation 
eliminates cyclical fluctuations thus, enabling to focus on long term relationships. It also 
enables reducing the length of the time dimension (T) of the panel as GMM estimator is more 
efficient for panel data with small T and large individual dimension (N). The estimation results 
from the system GMM (two-step) are displayed in table 9. These results are qualitatively the 
same with those found with the PSTR estimation. We find that government stability, the 
institutional variable used here has positive effect non-resource tax revenue, suggesting that 
improving institutions would enhance non-resource tax revenue mobilization in Africa. Once 
again, the results indicate that natural resources rents have negative effect on non-resource tax 
revenue (table 9). However, the interaction term between natural resource rents and government 
stability (Rents*Government stability) is positively related to non-resource tax ratio (table 9) 
suggesting that with better institutions, natural resource rents positively contribute to non-
resource tax revenue mobilization in Africa. From a policy implication perspective, these results 
provide an additional motivation to policy makers for improving the quality of institutions and 
diversifying the economy for better non-resource tax revenue mobilization. In other words, our 
findings suggest that African countries may experience more non-resource tax revenue if they 
use revenue from natural resources to support the economic diversification and to improve the 
quality of institutions. 
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Table 9: Non-linear effect of Natural resource rents on resource tax revenue: accounting 
for inertia in non-resource tax revenue. 
Non-resource tax revenue 
 
 
Sys GMM 
L.Non-resource tax revenue 0.700*** 
 (0.078) 
Natural resource rents (Rents) -0.374*** 
 (0.140) 
Government Stability -0.454*** 
 (0.150) 
Rents*Government Stability 0.029** 
 (0.014) 
GDP per capita 0.0004*** 
 (0.000) 
Trade openness 0.023*** 
 (0.008) 
Inflation 0.035 
 (0.024) 
Agriculture value added -0.01 
 (0.033) 
Constant 7.753*** 
 (2.487) 
  
Observations 112 
Number of countries 24 
ar1, pvalue 0.036 
Hansen,pvalue 0.228 
Number of instruments 18 
ar2, pvalue 0.153 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
8. Conclusion 
This paper analyses the effect of natural resources rents on non-resource tax revenue conditional 
on the level of economic diversification and the quality of institutions for 29 African countries 
over the period 1995-2012. The main methodology used is the panel smooth transition 
regression technique to account for heterogeneities and non-linearity in natural resources and 
non-resource tax relationship and the gradualism of the process towards diversification and 
better institutions in African countries. The results show that economic diversification and 
institutional quality modulate the effect of natural resources on non-resource tax revenue. The 
direct effect of natural resources rents on non-resource tax revenue is negative. However, 
natural resources rents tend to positively affect non-resource tax revenue for higher levels of 
economic diversification and better institutions. In terms of policy recommendations, our 
research findings suggest that African government invest more in economic diversification and 
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improve the quality of institutions so that natural resources revenue strengthens non-resource 
tax revenue mobilization performance in African countries. 
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Appendix 
List of countries 
Algeria, Botswana, Burkina faso, Cameroon, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda. 
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